Adrienne Young v. City of Pittsburgh by unknown
2014 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-4-2014 
Adrienne Young v. City of Pittsburgh 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014 
Recommended Citation 
"Adrienne Young v. City of Pittsburgh" (2014). 2014 Decisions. 371. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014/371 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2014 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
  
 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_________________ 
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CITY OF PITTSBURGH; COLLEEN BRUST; REYNE KACSUTA;  
THOMAS NEE; MICHAEL FLYNN; NATHAN HARPER, Commander;  
THOMAS MCCAFFREY; MARYLIN LAHOOD; COLLEEN SYPOLT;  
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CHARLES HENDERSON 
___________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 11-cv-00650) 
District Judge:  Honorable Cathy Bissoon 
____________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 7, 2014 
 
Before:  RENDELL, SMITH and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: April 4, 2014) 
 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Adrienne Young appeals the District Court’s summary judgment in favor of the 
City of Pittsburgh and individual Pittsburgh police officers (collectively, City 
Defendants), and an order dismissing her claims against seven Allegheny County 
 2 
 
probation officers (County Defendants).
1
 We will affirm. 
I 
 This case arises out of four arrests of Plaintiff Young by Pittsburgh Police. 
Because Young’s challenge to the District Court’s summary judgment depends on the 
historical and procedural facts of the case, we recount them in some detail. 
 The trouble began for Young around 2:30 a.m. on May 13, 2008, as she drove her 
Chevrolet Cobalt in the Friendship area of Pittsburgh. Officer Colleen Brust was on 
patrol that morning when she saw Young’s car cross the center line of a two-lane street 
and pull up alongside another car. Young then slowed down and moved back over, but as 
she did, the right front passenger side of her Chevrolet made contact with the other car’s 
driver’s side rear quarter. Officer Brust then activated the lights and sirens on her police 
cruiser and stopped both vehicles. Damage to both cars was minimal, and there were no 
injuries.  
 After Officer Brust effectuated the traffic stop, Young got out of her car and told 
Brust that the other driver had underage girls and drugs in his car. Brust called for 
backup, and two other officers arrived, including Sergeant Charles Henderson. Young 
returned to her vehicle while Brust spoke with the driver of the other car, Thomas 
Doswell, who had two female passengers. Doswell told Brust that Young was his ex-
girlfriend and that she had been harassing him since their breakup. Young claimed that 
                                              
 
1
 The City Defendants are Colleen Brust, Reyne Kacsuta, Thomas Nee, Michael 
Flynn, Nathan Harper, and Charles Henderson. The County Defendants are Thomas 
McCaffrey, Marylin Lahood, Colleen Sypolt, Linda Francis, Debbie Puc, Dan Trbovich, 
and Paul Larkin. 
 3 
 
after Officer Brust returned from Doswell’s car, her demeanor changed, and Brust told 
Young she was going to jail for trying to ―hurt‖ Doswell’s passengers. Young 
complained further that Brust had a male police officer pat her down, and when Young 
asked why Brust could not perform the search, Brust told her to shut up and added that 
she ―would be getting three counts of aggravated assault.‖  
 Based on Brust’s observations and the recommendation of Sergeant Henderson, 
Young was arrested at the scene and charged with first-degree aggravated assault, 18 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 2702(a)(1); reckless endangerment of another person, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 
2705; violation of a no passing zone, 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3307; and reckless driving, 75 
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3736. Brust noted in a deposition that before talking to either party, she 
had seen ―[Young] cross the center line and . . . get up to [Doswell’s] vehicle and attempt 
to ram her vehicle.‖ A141-42. Brust explained that she charged Young with aggravated 
assault because she could have caused serious bodily injury when she rammed Doswell’s 
car. Young was taken into custody and spent a night in the Allegheny County Jail.  
 Within a few days of her arrest, Young filed a complaint against Brust with the 
City of Pittsburgh’s Office of Municipal Investigations (OMI). Several weeks later, 
Young attempted to withdraw the complaint on the advice of a private detective who 
suggested she do so ―to ensure that her ordeal with the police would come to an end.‖ 
Young Br. at 12. Pursuant to OMI policy, however, the investigation continued.
2
 
 On July 22, 2008, Young appeared for a preliminary hearing before a magistrate. 
                                              
 
2
 On March 2, 2009, OMI issued its final report on Young’s complaint, 
exonerating Brust of wrongdoing in connection with the May 13, 2008 incident.   
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After Doswell’s passengers testified and Young presented photos of the damage to the 
two cars, the magistrate cut the hearing short, calling the incident ―nothing more than a 
light fender bender‖ and giving the parties five minutes to get together to ―figure out 
where you’re going with this‖ and ―work out what charges we’re going to hold here.‖ 
A247. The parties were unable to reach a resolution, however, which prompted the 
magistrate to say: 
Okay. I’ll tell you what I’m doing. It’s a garbage case. It shouldn’t have 
been here. I’m dismissing everything without prejudice, subject to re-filing. 
Get the charges good. 
 
A248.  
 In the meantime, the OMI investigation continued, and on September 16, 2008, 
Brust and Henderson were interviewed in connection with Young’s complaint. When 
interviewed by OMI, Brust and Henderson stated that they intended to refile the charges. 
Brust added that she planned to do so, at least in part, ―for [her] credibility.‖ A155.   
 On October 7, 2008, Brust re-filed charges against Young for the May 13 incident. 
The charges were substantially similar as before, except that the aggravated assault 
charge was downgraded to second-degree, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2702(a)(4). Lieutenant 
Reyne Kacsuta approved the re-filed charges, which were also reviewed and approved by 
the Allegheny County District Attorney’s Office. Based on the averments in the criminal 
complaint, a magistrate issued an arrest warrant for Young.   
 Pursuant to the warrant, Young was arrested at her home in the predawn hours of 
October 8, 2008. Young asked if she could change her clothes before going to jail, and 
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Kacsuta, a female officer, accompanied her to her bedroom while she did so. Young 
claims that Kacsuta watched her undress and called her a ―religious nut.‖ Although 
Kacsuta disputes that she watched Young undress or called her names, she concedes that 
she entered Young’s bedroom because Young was under arrest and it would have been 
inappropriate to allow her to move about her home unsupervised. Young was released on 
her own recognizance later that day.   
 Following her second arrest, Young met with then-Pittsburgh Police Chief Nathan 
Harper to discuss her initial arrest in May and her belief that her second arrest in October 
was in retaliation for her OMI complaint. Young appeared before a magistrate on 
November 18, 2008; the aggravated assault charges were again dismissed, but the 
remaining charges were held over for trial.  
 About six weeks later, Young called the Zone 5 police station and complained that 
Doswell had been harassing her with repeated phone calls. Detective Thomas Nee 
investigated the complaint, obtained phone records, and determined that Doswell had, in 
fact, called Young. In the course of his investigation, however, Detective Nee also 
discovered that Young had made phone calls to a number registered to Doswell, in spite 
of the fact that in July 2008 Doswell had obtained a protection from abuse order that 
prohibited Young from contacting him.  
 Nee discussed his findings with his boss, Kacsuta, who told him Young had 
violated the order and should be arrested. Nonetheless, Nee was unsure that probable 
cause existed to arrest Young for indirect criminal contempt, so he sought advice from 
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Assistant District Attorney David Spurgeon, who recommended further investigation. 
Nee then called Doswell to see if Young had contacted him. Doswell refused to answer 
Nee directly, but confirmed that the number belonged to him and that the phone was in 
his possession. Doswell’s refusal to cooperate gave Nee pause, but Kacsuta continued to 
pressure him to obtain a warrant. Nee talked to another assistant district attorney, 
Rebecca Auld, who was prosecuting the charges stemming from the May 13 incident; 
she, in turn, spoke with her supervisor, who recommended that Nee not obtain a warrant, 
although she did confirm that Young had violated the court order.  
 In light of Nee’s continued reluctance to file charges against Young for violating 
the order, Kacsuta ordered him to draft a report explaining why he had twice disregarded 
her orders to obtain a warrant for Young’s arrest. Although Nee did not want to file the 
charges, he ultimately did so on January 28, 2009, on Kacsuta’s orders. A magistrate 
approved an arrest warrant, and Young was arrested at her home ―in the middle of the 
night‖ on January 29, 2009. Kacsuta participated in the execution of the arrest warrant 
and Young again claims that Kacsuta accompanied her to her bedroom and called her a 
religious nut. Young was released on bond the same day as her arrest. The charges were 
continued until the expiration of the protection from abuse order on July 10, 2009, and 
never proceeded further.  
 Young was arrested a fourth time in March 2009. This time, the impetus for the 
arrest came from Renee Taylor, one of Doswell’s passengers from the May 13, 2008 
incident, who called the Zone 5 police station complaining that she had received a 
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threatening phone call from Young. Later that day, Taylor went to the police station to 
make a report and was interviewed by Pittsburgh Police Officer Michael Flynn. Kacsuta 
was the supervisor in the station at that time. In the affidavit of probable cause, Flynn 
stated that Taylor told him Young had been intimidating and harassing her and threatened 
to burn down her house in Wilkinsburg for not cooperating with Young’s OMI 
complaint. The affidavit also stated that Taylor believed Young was upset with Taylor for 
testifying against her; that Taylor had seen Young sitting in her car on Taylor’s street 
several times in the past week; and that Taylor had received several phone calls from a 
private number threatening her life if she did not drop the charges against Young. Flynn 
also averred that Taylor was in Pittsburgh at the time she received the phone calls.
3
 At the 
time he prepared his affidavit, Flynn was unaware that Taylor’s criminal history included 
several crimen falsi.  
 Based on Taylor’s complaint, Young was charged with misdemeanor violations of 
intimidation of a witness, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4952(a), and terroristic threats, 18 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 2706(a)(1). A magistrate approved an arrest warrant, and Young was 
arrested for the fourth time, at about 2 a.m. on March 5, 2009, at her home. Once again, 
Kacsuta was part of the team serving the warrant. Young was taken to the Allegheny 
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 Flynn’s affidavit contained several inconsistencies. First, Flynn claimed that he 
knew Young had committed a crime from ―personal observations and victims’ 
statements‖; according to Flynn, this was a typo, and the affidavit itself did not contain 
claims that Flynn had personally observed anything. Second, Flynn stated in his 
deposition that Taylor never told him she had received a phone call threatening her life. 
Also, Flynn transposed Young’s name and Taylor’s name in part of the affidavit, which 
he corrected by filing a supplemental report later in the month.  
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County Jail and held there for more than three weeks while she waited for an electronic 
monitoring device to become available.  
 Young remained on electronic monitoring until August 2009. The following 
month, Detective Nee emailed ADA Auld and Commander Ross of the Pittsburgh Police 
and notified them that Taylor’s phone records appeared to support Young’s contention 
that she had not called Taylor on March 4, 2009. In February 2010, the District Attorney 
(DA) chose not to prosecute the charges. Finally, in February 2010, Young went to trial 
on the remaining charges from the initial May 13, 2008 incident, and was found guilty of 
the summary offense of passing where prohibited. All other charges were dismissed by 
the court.  
II 
 In May 2011, Young filed a complaint in the Allegheny County Court of Common 
Pleas, alleging myriad constitutional violations. Defendants removed the case to the 
United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. In her second 
amended complaint, Young sued the City Defendants, in various combinations, for false 
arrest and malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in 
connection with all four arrests (Counts I–VIII); retaliatory prosecution in connection 
with her last three arrests, in violation of the First Amendment (Count IX); invasion of 
privacy against Kacsuta, in violation of the Fourth Amendment and in connection with 
the October 8, 2008 arrest (Count X); and violation of her First and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights to equal protection, freedom of religion, and to petition the 
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government, in connection with the arrests (Count XI). She also sued the County 
Defendants and several City Defendants for intentional infliction of emotional distress 
(Count XII) and conspiracy to deprive her of her Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights (Count XV). Finally, Young sued the County Defendants for violating 
her Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights (Count XIII) and for wrongful 
imprisonment in connection with her detention for the fourth arrest (Count XIV).  
 The District Court held a post-discovery conference on June 1, 2012. There, 
Young was represented by counsel and agreed to voluntarily dismiss her lawsuit against 
the County Defendants. Consequently, the County Defendants did not seek summary 
judgment. In her response to the City Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Young 
reiterated that she had voluntarily agreed to dismiss the claims against the County 
Defendants. The County Defendants’ attorney sent Young’s attorney a Rule 41(a) notice 
of voluntary dismissal, but it was never filed.  
 In March 2013, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the City 
Defendants. At about the same time, Young’s attorney sought to withdraw because 
Young had changed her mind about dismissing the County Defendants and ordered him 
not to file the notice of dismissal, despite having already agreed to dismiss the claims 
against the County Defendants. According to the District Court, Young’s counsel also 
―explained that discovery had revealed no plausible theory of recovery against the 
County Defendants.‖ Order Granting Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement, April 23, 
2013, ECF No. 98. The District Court subsequently allowed Young’s counsel to 
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withdraw and also granted the County Defendants’ motion to enforce the settlement 
agreement. This timely appeal followed.
4
  
III 
 We review the District Court’s summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts and 
making all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 
Montone v. City of Jersey City, 709 F.3d 181, 189 (3d Cir. 2013). Summary judgment is 
appropriate when ―there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.‖ Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  
 The District Court properly granted summary judgment on Young’s claims for 
false arrest and malicious prosecution because probable cause existed for all four arrests. 
The absence of probable cause is an essential element of both false arrest and malicious 
prosecution claims, and such claims cannot proceed if probable cause existed—regardless 
of whether the arrests at issue were a wise or typical use of police resources. See Dowling 
v. City of Philadelphia, 855 F.2d 136, 141 (3d Cir. 1988) (―The proper inquiry in a 
section 1983 claim based on false arrest . . . is not whether the person arrested in fact 
committed the offense but whether the arresting officers had probable cause to believe 
the person arrested had committed the offense.‖); McKenna v. City of Philadelphia, 582 
F.3d 447, 461 (3d Cir. 2009) (―To prevail on a malicious prosecution claim under section 
1983, a plaintiff must show . . . the proceeding was initiated without probable 
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 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. We 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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cause . . . . ‖).  
 Under the Fourth Amendment, an arrest is permissible ―where there is probable 
cause to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being committed.‖ Devenpeck v. 
Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004). ―Whether probable cause exists depends upon the 
reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the facts known to the arresting officer at the 
time of the arrest.‖ Id. Probable cause ―requires more than mere suspicion . . . [but] does 
not require that the officer have evidence sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.‖ Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482–83 (3d Cir. 1995). Rather, we 
consider the existence of probable cause via a ―common sense approach‖ based on the 
totality of the circumstances, Paff v. Kaltenbach, 204 F.3d 425, 436 (3d Cir. 2000), and 
viewed from the perspective of an objectively reasonable police officer. Maryland v. 
Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003). The constitutional validity of an arrest does not 
depend on whether the accused actually committed any crime, or whether a person is 
later acquitted of the crime of arrest. Wright v. City of Philadelphia, 409 F.3d 595, 602 
(3d Cir. 2005).  
 A district court may conclude ―that probable cause exists as a matter of law if the 
evidence, viewed most favorably to Plaintiff, reasonably would not support a contrary 
factual finding.‖ Merkle v. Upper Dublin School Dist., 211 F.3d 782, 788–89 (3d Cir. 
2000). Where an arrest is made pursuant to a warrant—as were Young’s last three 
arrests—the plaintiff challenging probable cause must show ―by a preponderance of the 
evidence: (1) that the police officer knowingly and deliberately, or with a reckless 
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disregard for the truth, made false statements or omissions that create a falsehood in 
applying for a warrant; and (2) that such statements or omissions are material, or 
necessary, to the finding of probable cause.‖ Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 786–87 (3d 
Cir. 2000). Here, even if Young could satisfy the first hurdle, a doubtful proposition at 
best, she would fail on the second. Therefore, based on the record before us, and viewed 
in the light most favorable to Young, we agree with the District Court that probable cause 
existed for all four of Young’s arrests. Accordingly, her claims for false arrest and 
malicious prosecution (Counts I-VIII) were properly rejected.
5
  
  Young also challenges Kacsuta’s observation of her as she changed clothes in her 
bedroom upon her second arrest as an invasion of privacy under the Fourth Amendment 
(Count X). As the District Court correctly concluded, however, ―[b]ecause [Young] was 
the subject of a lawful custodial arrest,‖ Kacsuta’s actions did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment, and Young’s ―apparent position that she should have been allowed access to 
her bedroom without officer supervision [while under arrest] is, to put it bluntly, absurd.‖ 
No. 11-CV-650, 2013 WL 1290950 at *10 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 26, 2013).   
 Nor do we find any error in the District Court’s summary judgment on Young’s 
equal protection claim (Count XI). ―The fact that there was no Fourth Amendment 
violation does not mean that one was not discriminatorily selected‖ for law enforcement 
action. Bradley v. United States, 299 F.3d 197, 205 (3d Cir. 2002); see also Carrasca v. 
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 The existence of probable cause also dooms Young’s First Amendment 
retaliatory prosecution claim (Count IX). See Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 265–66 
(2006). 
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Pomeroy, 313 F.3d 828, 836 (3d Cir. 2002). However, it is axiomatic that an equal 
protection claim in this context requires the plaintiff to show the official action ―(1) had a 
discriminatory effect and (2) [was] motivated by a discriminatory purpose.‖ Bradley, 299 
F.3d at 205. Here, Young has cited no evidence of record to suggest discriminatory 
effect, so this claim cannot proceed.  
 Finally, because Young did not present evidence that she suffered a constitutional 
violation, summary judgment was appropriate on her claims for supervisory liability, 
municipal liability, and conspiracy to violate her constitutional rights. For the reasons 
stated in its opinion, the District Court also appropriately granted summary judgment for 
Defendants on Young’s state-law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress 
(Count XII). We have considered the parties’ arguments on these points and conclude 
that no further analysis is necessary. Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s 
summary judgment in favor of the City Defendants. 
IV 
 Apart from her challenge to the District Court’s summary judgment in favor of the 
City Defendants, Young appeals the District Court’s order dismissing the County 
Defendants. That order was based not on an adjudication of the merits, but rather on 
Young’s representation to the Court that she would voluntarily dismiss the County 
Defendants. Young claims that the District Court erred when it dismissed the County 
Defendants, but this argument is unavailing. Young does not dispute that she orally 
represented to the District Court that she would voluntarily dismiss the County 
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Defendants, a position she reiterated in subsequent court filings, see Dkt. 83 at 10. The 
District Court, adverse parties, and Young’s attorney all reasonably relied upon that 
representation, and we hold that promise is enforceable. See, e.g., Edwards v. Wyatt, 335 
F.3d 261, 276–77 (3d Cir. 2003) (describing the elements of promissory estoppel).6 Thus, 
the District Court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the County Defendants.
7
  
* * * 
 On the record presented, the District Court did not err when it concluded as a 
matter of law that probable cause existed for all four of Adrienne Young’s arrests. That 
holding doomed most of Young’s claims, and for the reasons we and the District Court 
stated, her other claims against the City Defendants also fail. As for Young’s claims 
against the County Defendants, judgment was properly entered against her because she 
had agreed to dismiss them. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District 
Court in all respects.  
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 In addition, given Young’s oral representation to the District Court and to 
adverse parties, dismissal arguably also would have been proper under a contract theory, 
see, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 94, or pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Role v. Eureka Lodge No. 434, 402 F.3d 314, 318 (2d 
Cir. 2005).  
 
7
 Although we find no abuse of discretion by the District Court, we note that this 
case highlights the importance of having a court reporter available to record promises 
made by any party. To avoid problems such as the one encountered here, district courts 
should present to the parties a Rule 41(a) stipulation of dismissal that can be signed 
contemporaneously with the oral promise and promptly filed thereafter.   
